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The aim of this ar  ti  cle is to char  ac  ter  ise the dis  tri  bu  tion of losses in loans to Por  tu  guese non-fi  nan  cial
firms  un der  dif fer ent  mac ro eco nomic  sce nar ios.  The  topic  is  rel e vant  for  sev eral  rea sons.  First,  pe ri odic
as sess ments  by  in ter na tional  agen cies  aimed  at  eval u at ing  the  sound ness  of  a  coun try’s  fi nan cial  sys -
tem re  quire the setup of credit de  fault mod  els for loans in sev  eral mar  ket seg  ments, along with other so  -
phis  ti  cated tools for eco  nomic anal  y  sis. For in  stance, in 2006 the IMF con  ducted a Fi  nan  cial Sec  tor
As sess ment  Programme  (FSAP) in Por  tu  gal. In this con  text, a credit de  fault model in  cor  po  rat  ing mac  ro  -
eco  nomic fac  tors was de  vel  oped at Banco de Por  tu  gal. The model was used to es  ti  mate both the ex  -
pected loss and the dis  tri  bu  tion of losses in loans to non-fi  nan  cial firms, which are ob  vi  ous mea  sures of
in ter est  for  the  as sess ment.
1 Sec  ond, from a bank  ing su  per  vi  sion per  spec  tive, it is use  ful to gauge the
im  pact of ad  verse mac  ro  eco  nomic shocks on the bank  ing sys  tem in terms of the Cap  i  tal Ad  e  quacy Ra  tio
(CAR). For in  stance, one might be in  ter  ested in as  sess  ing how much cap  i  tal a par  tic  u  lar set of banks (or
a sin  gle bank) would need to cover low-prob  a  bil  ity un  ex  pected losses, un  der a given ad  verse mac  ro  eco  -
nomic sce  nario. As credit losses are ob  vi  ous and im  por  tant driv  ers of banks’ prof  it  abil  ity, reg  u  la  tors ded  i  -
cate a sig  nif  i  cant share of their ef  forts in en  sur  ing that both ex  pected and un  ex  pected credit losses in a
given ho  ri  zon un  der stress  ful sce  nar  ios are ad  e  quately cov  ered by ei  ther pro  vi  sions or own funds, or a
com bi na tion of both. Third, pe ri odic as sess ments of credit risk might use the dis tri bu tion of losses to iden -
tify  sig nif i cant  vul ner a bil i ties  of  the  loan  port fo lio  to  non-fi nan cial  firms.  For  in stance,  sup pose  an  an a lyst
con sid ers  two  dif fer ent  mac ro eco nomic  sce nar ios:  one  with  par tic u larly  high  in ter est  rates,  the  other  with
a par  tic  u  larly large up  surge of un  em  ploy  ment. If the an  a  lyst con  cludes that under the first scenario the
distribution of losses is somewhat more adverse than under the second scenario, this might lead her to
recommend a careful focus of the assessment on interest rate-related issues.
Based on credit reg is ter and other data on Por  tu guese firms, we use a bi nary re  sponse model to es ti mate 
the prob  a  bil  ity of de  fault on a loan by a firm. We per  form Monte Carlo sim  u  la  tions to es  ti  mate the dis  tri  bu  -
tion of losses in loans to Por  tu  guese non-fi  nan  cial firms un  der a “base  line” mac  ro  eco  nomic sce  nario and
two  “stress”  sce nar ios,  la belled  “dis rup tive  ad just ment”  and  “cy cli cal  asynchrony”.
2  The  mac ro eco nomic
sce  nar  ios span the pe  riod 2005-2008 and con  sist of com  plete and con  sis  tent pro  jec  tions for the Por  tu  -
guese econ  omy us  ing a full-fledged mac  ro  eco  nomic model.
3 All sce  nar  ios were con  structed us  ing in  for  -
ma  tion avail  able by De  cem  ber 2005. Thus, the mac  ro  eco  nomic sce  nar  ios pre  sented here are not
fore  casts of cur  rent mac  ro  eco  nomic con  di  tions, nor do they re  flect Banco de Por  tu  gal’s as  sess  ment of
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* The analyses, opinions and findings of this paper represent the views of the authors, they are not   necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal.
** Economics and Research Department, Banco de Portugal.
(1) Banco de Portugal (2007) Occasional Paper no 1, presents the design and results of the stress tests carried out in the context of the 2006 IMF FSAP; parts
of that paper overlap this article. 111111
(2) Details about the statistical model and other aspects of the default probability estimation are provided in Antunes, Ribeiro and Antão (2005).
(3) Details about the macroeconomic model used in the projections can be found in Castro (2005).what a stress  ful mac  ro  eco  nomic sce  nario would be un  der the cur  rent con  di  tions. Rather, these re  sults
aim merely at giv  ing a broad per  spec  tive about what an assessment of aggregate credit risk might look
like at a particular point in time.
The “base  line” sce  nario is an ex  ten  sion to 2008 of the mac  ro  eco  nomic pro  jec  tions con  ducted in the con  -
text of the Eurosystem De cem  ber 2005 Broad Mac  ro  eco  nomic Pro  jec  tion Ex  er  cise.
4 It com  prises a mod  -
er ate  re cov ery  of  over all  mac ro eco nomic  con di tions  during  the  2006-2008  period.
The “dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment” sce  nario as  sumes an abrupt ad  just  ment of the global im  bal  ances in 2006.
US eco  nomic ac  tiv  ity sharply de  cel  er  ates, and world  wide eco  nomic ac  tiv  ity en  sues. There is a real ap  -
pre  ci  a  tion of the euro with re  spect to the dol  lar and a sharp de  cline in global stock prices. The ECB is as  -
sumed to ad  just its mon  e  tary pol  icy by cutting intervention rates.
The “cy  cli  cal asynchrony” sce  nario con  sid  ers the im  pact of an un  ex  pected in  crease in pro  duc  tiv  ity in the
euro area, caus  ing higher do  mes  tic de  mand and im  ports. This, how  ever, does not spill over to Por  tu  -
guese ex  ports. Oil prices in  crease through  out the sim  u  la  tion ho  ri  zon. The ECB ad  justs short-term in  ter  -
est rates up  wards. Cy  cli  cal asynchrony be  tween Por  tu  gal and the euro area econ  omy re  flects fall  ing
eco  nomic ac  tiv  ity in Por  tu  gal while the rest of the euro area grows briskly.
The mac  ro  eco  nomic sce  nar  ios are fed into the credit de  fault model. Un  der sim  pli  fy  ing as  sump  tions and
us  ing Monte Carlo sim  u  la  tions, we are able to study the dis  tri  bu  tion of losses in loans to non-fi  nan  cial
firms, as well as changes on the Cap  i  tal Ad  e  quacy Ra  tio (CAR) of the Por  tu  guese bank  ing sec  tor
  associated with each scenario.
We con  clude that the dis  tri  bu  tion of losses is right-skewed, with per  cen  tile 95 of the loss in 2008 equal to
184 per cent of the mean in the base  line sce  nario and 146 per cent in the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario;
the fig  ure for the cy  cli  cal asynchrony sce  nario is 144 per cent. These re  sults im  ply that, as ex  pected
losses in  crease, losses tend to lie nearer to the mean in rel  a  tive terms. In other words, un  der “base  line”
con  di  tions, ex  pected losses in 2008 are low and there is a 5 per cent chance that losses are more than 84 
per cent higher than the av  er  age; un  der “stress” con  di  tions, ex  pected losses are high, but with the same
prob a bil ity of 5 per cent, losses will be just 44 or 46 per cent higher than the av er age. There seems thus to 
ex  ist a mech  a  nism that nar  rows the dis  tri  bu  tion of losses as expected losses increase.
In terms of the over  all CAR, we con  clude that the Por  tu  guese bank  ing sec  tor was, as of end-2005, per  -
fectly ca  pa  ble of ab  sorb  ing the large mac  ro  eco  nomic shocks pos  ited in the stress sce  nar  ios, with the
CAR ra  tio well-above the min  i  mum re  quire  ment of 8 per cent in the en  tire sim  u  la  tion pe  riod. Given actual
data for 2005, our es  ti  mates im  ply that yearly losses on the cor  po  rate port  fo  lio are com  fort  ably be  low the
reg  u  la  tory cap  i  tal buffer with probability of 99.5 per cent.
This ar  ti  cle is or  gan  ised as fol  lows. The next section  briefly  de scribes  the  mac ro eco nomic  sce nar ios,  the
data, the model for de faulted loans, and the pro ce dure adopted in the es ti ma tion of losses. Section 3 then 
pres ents the main fea tures of the loss dis tri bu tion. Section 4 as sesses the im pact of mac ro eco nomic con -
di  tions on the CAR of the en  tire Por  tu  guese bank  ing sys  tem, hold  ing all other risk fac  tors con  stant.
Section 5 concludes.
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(4) These projections were superseded by Banco de Portugal’s forecasts published in summer 2006 and winter 2006 issues of Economic Bulletin. 44444444442. MODELLING LOSSES UNDER MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS
This Sec  tion de  scribes the mac  ro  eco  nomic sce  nar  ios, the data and the model for de  faulted loans, the
pro  ce  dure adopted in the es  ti  ma  tion of losses, and is mostly a sum  mary of ma  te  rial avail  able in Antunes,
Ribeiro and Antão (2005).
2.1. The macroeconomic scenarios
We use a “base line” and two “stress” mac ro eco nomic sce nar ios. They con  sist of com plete and in te grated 
pro jec tions  of  mac ro eco nomic  con di tions  for  the  Por tu guese  econ omy  us ing  a  full-fledged  mac ro eco -
nomic an  nual model.
5
The base  line sce  nario is an ex  ten  sion to 2008 (with small changes) of the mac  ro  eco  nomic pro  jec  tions
con  ducted in the con  text of the Eurosystem De  cem  ber 2005 Broad Mac  ro  eco  nomic Pro  jec  tion Ex  er  cise.
It  com prises  a  mod er ate  re cov ery  of  mac ro eco nomic  con di tions  dur ing  the  2006-2008  pe riod  vis-à-vis
2005.
The dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario pos  its an abrupt ad  just  ment of the global im  bal  ances in early 2006.
There is a sharp de  celer  ation of the US eco  nomic ac  tiv  ity, which trans  lates into a slow  down in world  wide
eco  nomic ac  tiv  ity. In  ves  tors’ port  fo  lios shy away from the US dol  lar, lead  ing to a real ap  pre  ci  a  tion of the
euro vis-à-vis the dol  lar. There is also a sharp de  cline in global stock prices. Fi  nally, the ECB is as  sumed
to ad  just its mon  e  tary pol  icy and cut its in  ter  ven  tion rates, re  flect  ing the down  ward ad  just  ment in in  fla  tion
stem  ming from the ap  pre  ci  a  tion of the euro, and the slowdown in economic activity.
As in the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario, the cy  cli  cal asynchrony sce  nario con  sid  ers the im  pact of an un  -
ex  pected in  crease in pro  duc  tiv  ity in the euro area. The cy  cli  cal asynchrony sce  nario in  cludes neg  a  tive
out  put growth over the sim  u  la  tion ho  ri  zon. How  ever, the re  ces  sion ob  served in this sce  nario is milder
than that of the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario. Gross fixed cap  i  tal for  ma  tion and pri  vate con  sump  tion
are most af  fected by in  ter est rates’ surge. The in  creased ex ter nal de  mand does not cause a rise of Por tu -
guese ex  ports; in  stead, a 3 per cent mar  ket share loss in each year is as  sumed vis-à-vis the base  line.
This sce  nario thus in  volves negative GDP growth and high interest rates and inflation.
Ta  ble 1 pro  vides de  tails about the sce  nar  ios in terms of the short-term in  ter  est rate and the GDP growth
rate.
2.2. The data and the statistical model
The data come from two sources: the credit data from the Cen tral  de  Responsabilidades de Crédito
(CRC), which is the Por tu guese credit reg is ter; and the Estatísticas Gerais (EG) da ta  base for firm-spe  -
cific in  for  ma  tion. We used a sam  ple of firms clas  si  fied in terms of to  tal ex  po  sure (in a to  tal of 4 classes,
with larger firms in terms of credit ex  po  sure hav  ing higher rep  re  sen  ta  tive  ness in the sam  ple), which
was strat  i  fied by ac  tiv  ity sec  tor (in a to  tal of 15 dif  fer  ent ac  tiv  ity sec  tors). We de  fined the “loan” as the
sta  tis  ti  cal unit of ob  ser  va  tion, since this is the rel  e  vant con  cept of in  ter  est when look  ing at de  fault
events in par  tic  u  lar loans. A “loan” is un  der  stood to be the bi  lat  eral credit re  la  tion  ship be  tween a firm in
the  sam ple  and  a  sin gle  fi nan cial  in ter me di ary.  The  CRC monthly data were trans  formed into quar  terly
data. The sam  ple includes almost 2 million observations and ranges from 1995q1 to 2004q4.
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(5)  As mentioned above, the macroeconomic scenarios should be interpreted as merely illustrative. See footnote 4.We use a probit model with the “de  fault e  ven  t” de  fined as fol  lows. For any given loan, we first com  pute
its to  tal amount and the past due amount (which is equal to or less than the pre vi ous quan tity). The “de -
fault” oc  curs when pos  i  tive past due amounts are reg  is  tered in three con  sec  u  tive months and the
amount past due three months ago was zero.
The model in  cludes regressors at the loan, firm and ag  gre  gate levels. Ex  am  ples in  clude, at the loan
level, an in  di  ca  tor of the e  ven  t that, not in  clud  ing the loan un  der ob  ser  va  tion, the loan’s obligor has on
av  er  age de  faulted on more than half of its loans dur  ing the cur rent quar ter. At the firm level, we use, for
in  stance, cat  e  gor  i  cal vari  ables for the ac  tiv  ity sec  tor and the firm’s to  tal debt. At the mac  ro  eco  nomic
level, we use, for ex  am  ple, short-term nom  i  nal in  ter  est rates and deviations of GDP from trend.
We de  ter  mine the dis  tri  bu  tion of losses through Monte Carlo sim  u  la  tions. In each sim  u  la  tion, we use
the model to ran domly clas  sify each loan as hav ing de  faulted or not. Sum ming all “de faulted” loans, we 
have  an  ag gre gate  mea sure  of  loan  de faults  for  that  par tic u lar  ex per i ment.  Re peat ing  this  pro ce dure
many times al  lows us to ob  tain a Monte Carlo es  ti  mate of the loan loss distribution.
In or  der to per  form the sim  u  la  tions un  der the three mac  ro  eco  nomic sce  nar  ios, we as  sume that the
char  ac  ter  is  tics of the credit port  fo  lio do not change in re  sponse to mac  ro  eco  nomic con  di  tions. There  -
fore, all the vari  a  tion in the loss dis  tri  bu  tion is caused by changes in the mac  ro  eco  nomic vari  ables, ei  -
ther di  rectly or through their in  ter  ac  tions with firm-level vari  ables. This hy  poth  e  sis may be sub  ject to
crit  i  cism, since it ig  nores the en  dog  e  nous port  fo  lio change that would oc  cur as the mac  ro  eco  nomic
con  di  tions evolved, firms de  faulted and even  tu  ally ex  ited ac  tiv  ity, and new firms and loans ar  rived. We
chose to keep the port fo lio un changed, im plic itly as sum ing that the firms and loans leav ing the portfolio 
do not differ significantly from entrant firms and loans.
A num ber of crit i cisms may be cast over this ex er cise. The credit de fault model just de scribed omits im -
por  tant di  men  sions that might help ex  plain de  fault. This was a con  se  quence of the lack of com  pre  hen  -
sive data on the firms’ bal  ance sheets. The use of more com  pre  hen  sive in  for  ma  tion would al  low for a
better char  ac  teri  sa  tion of each firm. Some ec  ono  met  ric is  sues might also be raised (such as non-ob  -
served  het er o ge ne ity);  other  work ing  hy poth e ses,  in  par tic u lar  those  as sum ing  a  fixed  port fo lio  struc -
ture, may also be in  suf  fi  cient or in  ad  e  quate. In view of these crit  i  cisms, the results should be
interpreted cautiously.
Due to com  pu  ta  tional con  straints, we used a sam  ple cov  er  ing the en  tire port  fo  lio of credit to Por  tu  -
guese non-fi  nan  cial firms as of end-2004. We per  formed 10,000 ex  per  i  ments for each year and sce  -
nario in the sim  u  la  tion horizon.
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2005 2006 2007 2008
Baseline
Short-run interest rate 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4
GDP growth rate 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.3
Disruptive adjustment
Short-run interest rate 2.2 1.0 0.8 0.9
GDP growth rate 0.3 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1
Cyclical asynchrony
Short-run interest rate 2.2 3.6 4.2 4.9
GDP growth rate 0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.23. THE DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES
Be fore we turn to the dis tri bu  tion of losses, let us first take a look at their ex  pected val ues. Ta  ble 2 pres -
ents ex  pected losses in yearly terms for the sce  nar  ios as a per  cent  age of to  tal ex  po  sure to non-fi  nan  -
cial firms, where it was as  sumed that on av  er  age 50 per cent of a de  faulted loan is effectively lost.
As ex  pected, the stress sce  nar  ios have in 2008 more than twice the ex  pected loss of the base  line sce  -
nario. This is mostly due to the eco  nomic re  ces  sion em  bed  ded in both the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment and
the cy  cli  cal asynchrony sce  nar  ios. The cy  cli  cal asynchrony sce  nario in  duces the high  est loss as of
2008 due to the high in ter est rates. As for the dis  rup  tive ad just ment sce  nario, lower in  ter est rates (rel a  -
tive to the base line) are not enough to com pen sate for the strong and neg a tive eco nomic growth ef fect. 
In both cases, GDP grows considerably below its long-run trend.
Charts 1 and 2 pres  ent the dis  tri bu  tion of losses as a frac  tion of the mean loss in the base  line and each
stress sce  nario.
6 Ta  ble 3 pres  ents per  cen  tiles of the loss mea  sured as a per  cent  age of mean loss, for
the three scenarios.
Con  sis  tent with the fact that, in the base  line sce  nario, mac  ro  eco  nomic vari  a  tion is such that the ex  -
pected loss de  creases very slowly in the sim  u  la  tion ho ri zon, the dis tri bu  tion of losses shows lit tle vari  a  -
tion. In gen  eral terms, to  tal losses are skewed to the right, with the me  dian at around 90 per cent of the
av er age  in  the  whole  sim u la tion  ho ri zon.  The  dis tri bu tion  is  also  bi modal,  a  char ac ter is tic  com mon  to
the stress sce  nar  ios up to 2006. For in  stance, in 2005 there is a lo  cal max  i  mum of the prob  a  bil  ity den  -
sity just above 160 per cent of the mean for the base  line case. This prob a  bly has to do with the con  cen  -
tra  tion of large loans in the credit port  fo  lio. For rel  a  tively be  nign out  comes, only some large loans
de  fault and we have losses around the me  dian. How  ever, if a suf  fi  cient num  ber of large loans de  faults,
the cu  mu  la  tive ef  fect is go  ing to be that at some large value the den  sity of prob  a  bil  ity be  comes con  sid  -
er  able. This might hap  pen 10 per cent of the time, which is approximately the probability mass above
1.5 in Chart 1 for 2005.
As  doc u mented  in  Ta ble  3,  the  char ac ter is tics  of  the  rel a tive  loss  dis tri bu tion  un der  the  dis rup tive  ad just -
ment sce  nario do not dif  fer much from the base  line. At a first glance, the most strik ing dif  fer  ence be  tween
both is the fact that the sec  ond  ary hump is closer to the mean by the end of the pro  jec  tion ho  ri  zon. There
is some pre  lim  i  nary ev  i  dence that this hump is partly as  so  ci  ated to port  fo  lio con  cen  tra  tion in large firms,
which sug  gests that ad  verse shocks feed through the credit loss dis  tri  bu  tion mostly by in  creas  ing the ex  -
pected value of de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties in the port  fo  lio of smaller firms, while the un  ex  pected part arises es  -
sen  tially from larger firms. This is in line with the ra  tio  nale for cal  i  brat  ing the   Basel I  I risk weighted as  sets
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Table 2
ESTIMATED YEARLY LOSSES IN EACH SCENARIO FOR CREDIT PORTFOLIO TO NON FINANCIAL FIRMS
All values in percentage
2005 2006 2007 2008
Baseline 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0
Disruptive adjustment 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.1
Cyclical asynchrony 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.3
(6) All histograms in this article are kernel density estimates using the artificially generated data.Banco de Por  tu  gal | Fi nan cial  Sta bil ity  Re port  2006
















DISTRIBUTION OF YEARLY LOSS AS A FRACTION OF THE MEAN















DISTRIBUTION OF YEARLY LOSS AS A FRACTION OF THE MEAN
Baseline and cyclical asynchrony scenarios
Ba se li ne Dis rup ti ve  adjustment
Ba se li ne Cy cli cal  asynchronyfor mu lae,  whose  pa ram e ters  are,  cet eris  pa ri bus, more favourable to corporate and retail SMEs, than
large corporations.
Un  der the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario, the co  ef  fi  cient of vari  a  tion (de  fined as the ra  tio of the stan  -
dard de  vi  a  tion to the mean) of the loss dis tri  bu  tion de  creases by 32 per cent dur  ing the sim  u  la  tion ho  ri  -
zon. This de  crease in the rel  a  tive dis  per  sion of losses is con  sis  tent with the frame  work put for  ward in
Basel Com  mit  tee on Bank  ing Su  per  vi  sion (1999). There it is shown that the co  ef  fi  cient of vari  a  tion of a
par tic u lar  fa cil ity  is  roughly  pro por tional  to  1 p for small p, where p is the prob  a  bil  ity of de  fault.
7 Since
un der  the  dis rup tive  ad just ment  sce nario  p  de te ri o rates  uni formly  across  fa cil i ties,  the  co ef fi cient  of
variation of the total credit loss distribution should also decrease.
The above com  ments also ap  ply to the cy  cli  cal asynchrony sce  nario. There is es  sen  tially one dif  fer  -
ence be  tween the two stress sce  nar  ios. By the end of the sim  u  la  tion ho  ri  zon, ex  pected losses are
higher for the cy  cli  cal asynchrony case, which is a con  se  quence of the higher interest rates.
The amount of losses rel  a  tive to to  tal ex  po  sure that is lost can  not be con  veyed by Charts 1 and 2. In
terms of the rel e vant ex po sure, we see from Ta ble 2 that, in yearly terms, about 1 per cent of to tal ex po -
sure is lost in the base  line case. Charts 3 and 4 and Ta  ble 4 char  ac  ter  ise the yearly to  tal loss as a per  -
cent  age of the to  tal ex  po  sure amount. This is a rel  a  tive Value-at-Risk (VaR) mea  sure. For in  stance,
the 99 per cent VaR is the thresh  old above which losses lie 1 per cent of the years.
8
Let us now turn to the rel  a  tive VaR re  sults. The most prom  i  nent dif  fer  ence be  tween the base  line and
the stress sce  nar  ios is that the dis  tri  bu  tion in the stress sce  nar  ios shifts to the right dur  ing the sim  u  la  -
tion pe  riod (Charts 3 and 4), while that of the base  line sce  nario re  mains roughly static. This re  flects the
ad verse  mac ro eco nomic  en vi ron ment  em bed ded  in  the  stress  scenarios.
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Table 3
PERCENTILES OF THE YEARLY LOSS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE MEAN
2005 2006 2007 2008
Baseline p1 73 73 72 73
p5 77 77 76 76
p50 90 90 89 90
p95 177 181 183 184
p99 208 217 218 221
Disruptive adjustment p1 73 75 75 76
p5 77 78 79 79
p50 90 91 92 91
p95 177 156 152 146
p99 208 188 185 183
Cyclical asynchrony p1 73 73 75 76
p5 77 77 78 79
p50 90 90 91 92
p95 177 178 153 144
p99 208 209 193 177
(7) This is true whether Loss-Given-Default is stochastic or not.
(8) This study considers only the VaR of loans to non financial firms. It should be noted that the VaR of loans to non financial firms does not add up with the VaR
of loans, for instance, to households.Banco de Por  tu  gal | Fi nan cial  Sta bil ity  Re port  2006
















DISTRIBUTION OF YEARLY LOSS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPOSURE















DISTRIBUTION OF YEARLY LOSS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPOSURE
Baseline and cyclical asynchrony scenarios
Ba se li ne Dis rup ti ve  adjustment
Ba se li ne Cy cli cal  asynchronyWe see in Ta  ble 4 that the base  line sce  nario to  tal loss in 2005 is es  ti  mated to be less than 2 per cent of
the ag  gre  gate ex  po  sure with a 95 per cent prob  a  bil  ity. If we want to be more con  ser  va  tive, these re  -
sults sug  gest that at most 2.3 per  cen  t of the ex  po  sure is lost in 2005 with a 99 per  cen  t con  fi  dence
level.
9 We see that the de  crease of losses in the sim  u  la  tion ho  ri  zon is ac  com  pa  nied by a de  crease in
the 95 and 99 per  cen  t levels. For the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario, the cor  re  spond  ing val  ues in  -
crease by 1 and 1.5 per  cent  age points. These fig  ures are, re  spec  tively, 1.4 and 1.8 for the cy  cli  cal
asynchrony case. This im  plies that, in terms of credit to non-fi  nan  cial firms, the cy  cli  cal asynchrony
sce  nario is more strin  gent than the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario, both on average and on the right
tail of the loss distribution.
To con  vey a quan  ti ta  tive no tion of how much out  comes dif  fer un der the base line and the stress sce  nar -
ios, let us give an ex  am  ple. For the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario, the me  dian loss in 2008 is 1.9 per
cent of to  tal ex  po  sure. In con  trast, such loss cor  re  sponds to the per  cen  tile 96 in the base  line case.
There  fore, if the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario ma  teri  al  ised, an out  come with loss above 1.9 per cent
of ex  po  sure would be likely (50 per cent prob  a  bil  ity), while un  der the base  line sce  nario, such an ad  -
verse out  come would still be pos  si  ble, but much less likely (4 per cent probability).
4. IMPACT ON THE CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIO (CAR)
This sec tion deals with the way losses af  fect the Cap i  tal Ad  e  quacy Ra  tio (CAR) un der the three mac ro -
eco nomic  sce nar ios.
10 To this aim, we make sim  pli  fy  ing as  sump  tions about the be  hav  iour of banks
through out  the  sim u la tion  ho ri zon.  We  as sume  that  losses  fol low  the  dis tri bu tion  doc u mented  in  sec -
tion 3. We use own funds, risk-weighted ex  po  sure and to  tal ex  po  sure as of end-2005, and pro  ceed to
the es ti ma  tion of the changes in own funds due to loss vari  abil  ity. We then use these es ti mates in or  der 
to ob  tain the im  pact of losses in credit to non-fi nan  cial firms on the CAR, ab  stract  ing from any other im  -
pact. We thus make the sim  pli  fy  ing as  sump  tion that vari  abil  ity of losses in credit to non-fi  nan  cial firms
is the sole source of variability during simulations.
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Table 4
PERCENTILES OF THE YEARLY LOSS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPOSURE
2005 2006 2007 2008
Baseline p1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
p5 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7
p95 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8
p99 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.2
Disruptive adjustment p1 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6
p5 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6
p95 2.0 2.3 2.6 3.0
p99 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.8
Cyclical asynchrony p1 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.8
p5 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.9
p95 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.4
p99 2.3 2.8 3.4 4.1
(9) In a somewhat different context (using a macroeconomic reduced-form credit risk model) and for the Finnish 2003q2 credit portfolio to non financial firms,
Virolainen (2004) reports a comparable figure of 1.81 per cent.
(10) The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is the quotient between consolidated own funds and risk-weighted exposure.The start  ing point for the CAR was cal  i  brated with actual data, i.e. the av  er  age ag  gre  gate fig  ure for the
whole bank  ing sys  tem at end-2005 (11.3 per cent). This level im  plied a cap  i  tal buffer of around 3.3
points, which re  sults from the com  par  i  son with the 8 per cent min  i  mum reg  u  la  tory level. It should be
pointed out that this min i  mum level of capitalisation could be un der stood un der a Basel II frame work as 
the one which is suf  fi  cient to cover ex  treme un  ex  pected losses in a one year ho  ri  zon, af  ter tak  ing into
ac  count the provisioning ad  e  quacy cov  er  ing ex  pected losses, and as  sum  ing that sound risk man  age  -
ment sys  tem con  trols are in place. In other words, 8 per cent of the risk weighted ex  po  sure would be
the Value-at-Risk at some con  ser  va  tively high con  fi  dence level, for in  stance 99.5 per cent. Ac  cord  -
ingly, the prob  a  bil  ity of losses in ex  cess of own funds re  quire  ments over a one-year horizon would be
lower than 0.5 per cent.
The ex  er  cise that we are go  ing to per  form is the fol  low  ing: what is the dis  tri  bu  tion of the cap  i  tal buffer
(the ex  cess cap  i  tal over the min  i  mum) given that (i) the over  all char  ac  ter  is  tics of the credit port  fo  lio to
non-fi nan cial firms re main un changed; (ii) ex  pected own funds, risk-weighted ex po sure and to tal ex po -
sure re  main at their 2005 levels; (iii) all other sources of risk are ei  ther ig  nored or as  sumed to be cov  -
ered by pro  vi  sions or the ex  pected flow of in  come; and (iv) the mac  ro  eco  nomic en  vi  ron  ment is
changing according to a given scenario?
Since losses im  pact own cap  i  tal di  rectly and we as  sume that su  per  vi  sory cap  i  tal and risk-weighted ex  -
po  sure are kept at their 2005 levels, the cap  i  tal buffer dis  tri  bu  tion in per  cent  age points of the CAR is
sim  i  lar to those of Charts 1 and 2, ap  pro  pri  ately in  verted and rescaled. This is of course a sim  pli  fy  ing
as  sump  tion. When faced with macro-eco  nomic sur  prises im  pact  ing on credit losses, banks ad  just
their port  fo  lio (to  wards or away from, and within, credit to non-fi  nan  cial firms). As de  faults oc  cur and
new firms start ac  tiv  ity, the char  ac  ter  is  tics of the pool of risks also changes. We thus as  sume that
banks change their port  fo  lio and al  lo  cate su  per  vi  sory cap  i  tal so as to keep ex  pected risk-weighted
exposure and own funds requirements at their 2005 levels.
Ta  ble 5 pres  ents the re  sults. The prob  a  bil  ity that, in 2008, the cap  i  tal buffer would be lower than 2.8
per  cent  age points is 0.5 per cent in the base  line. In the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario, the cor  re  -
spond  ing fig  ure at the end of the sim  u  la  tion ho  ri  zon is 2.1 per  cent  age points. For the cy  cli  cal
asynchrony case, the value is 1.9 per  cent  age points. This means that the port  fo  lio of credit to non-fi  -
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Table 5
PERCENTILES AND AVERAGE OF THE CAPITAL BUFFER RESULTING FROM LOSSES IN CREDIT TO
NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
All values in percentage points
2006 2007 2008
Baseline p0.5 2.6 2.7 2.8
p1 2.8 2.8 2.9
average 3.3 3.4 3.4
p50 3.4 3.4 3.4
Disruptive adjustment p0.5 2.5 2.3 2.1
p1 2.6 2.5 2.2
average 3.2 3.1 2.9
p50 3.2 3.1 3.0
Cyclical asynchrony p0.5 2.5 2.2 1.9
p1 2.6 2.4 2.0
average 3.2 3.1 2.8
p50 3.3 3.1 2.9nan  cial cor  po  ra  tions would be re  spon  si  ble for, at most, the ero  sion of roughly one third of ex  cess cap  i  -
tal in a three-year ho  ri  zon with 99.5 per cent prob  a  bil  ity and con  di  tional on the ma  teri  ali  sa  tion of
particularly stressful macroeconomic scenarios.
The main con  clu  sion from this ex  er  cise is that the im  pact of purely mac  ro  eco  nomic fac  tors on the CAR
via non-fi  nan  cial firms, though sig  nif i  cant, ap  pears man age  able, even un der very ex  treme and con  ser -
va tive  assumptions.
5. FINAL REMARKS
This ar  ti  cle de  scribes and pres  ents re  sults con  cern  ing the dis  tri  bu  tion of losses in the credit port  fo  lio to
Por tu guese  non-fi nan cial  firms  un der  three  dif fer ent  mac ro eco nomic  sce nar ios  (the  base line,  the  dis -
rup  tive ad  just  ment and the cy  cli  cal asynchrony sce  nar  ios), for Por  tu  guese banks as a whole. The
main con  clu  sions are: (i) mac  ro  eco  nomic fac  tors af  fect the dis  tri  bu  tion of losses both in terms of lo  ca  -
tion (mean, me dian) and shape (skew  ness, dis  per sion and rel a  tive place  ment of modes); (ii) the stress 
sce  nar  ios in  duce a be  hav  iour of losses that is much more ad  verse than un  der the base  line sce  nario;
(iii) the cy  cli  cal asynchrony sce  nario is more stress  ful than the dis  rup  tive ad  just  ment sce  nario due es  -
sen  tially to higher in  ter  est rates; (iv) even though other risk sources were ig  nored in the anal  y  sis and
should be taken into ac  count to de  liver a more com  plete pic  ture, the cap  i  tal buffer of the bank  ing sys  -
tem as a whole looks ad  e  quate to ab  sorb swiftly very un  likely credit events in the cor  po  rate port  fo  lio,
leaving the capital adequacy ratio comfortably above the minimum regulatory level.
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